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ESSAY
JAPAN'S BIG BANG FINANCIAL
REFORMS'
Ernest T. Patrikis"
I. INTRODUCTION
Japan's "Big Bang" reforms will radically alter its financial
marketplace. The barriers separating banks, securities, and
insurance companies are being lowered, and regulation of the
products financial companies offer and the fees they charge are
being eased. Once the Big Bang reforms are fully implemented,
Japan's cloistered financial system may come to resemble the
open, competitive system we know in the United States.
The more competitive environment promoted by the Big
Bang promises important benefits for Japan and for its eco-
nomic partners. For Japanese savers, the reforms should mean
higher returns, lower fees, a wider choice of products, and
better service. Moreover, increased competition in the financial
sector should raise the efficiency with which Japan's savings
are invested, which may ultimately boost Japan's prospects for
sustained economic growth. For financial companies in the
United States and elsewhere, the Big Bang reforms mean new
opportunities to market their products and expertise to a vast
market-a market which represents the world's second largest
pool of privately held savings.
Of course, the path to reform is invariably a bumpy one,
and the Big Bang faces important potential obstacles. I will
have more to say about the obstacles later. The main theme of
this Essay will be opportunity: opportunity for Japan and op-
t This essay was originally delivered as a speech to a breakfast round table
of the New York Stock Exchange, sponsored by the Brooklyn Law School Center
for the Study of International Business Law, on April 27, 1998.
* First Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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portunity for the United States, and other nations.
Before I continue, I would like to give you a sense of the
scale of the opportunity. The stock of Japanese personal sector
financial assets is enormous: Y1,209 trillion, or $10.4 trillion,
as of the end of March 1997 (Table 1). This figure refers to the
gross financial assets of households and unincorporated busi-
nesses; if real assets were included as well, the figure would be
about twice as high. Japan's household sector asset-to-income
ratio is similar to that for other major industrial countries,
larger than Germany's, but slightly smaller than those of the
United States or United Kingdom.
TABLE 1 PERSONAL SECTOR GROSS FINANCIAL ASSETS'
United United
Japan States Kingdom Germany
Total Y Trillion 1,209 2,404 303 333
Ratio to Nomi- 2.4 2.7 2.7 1.3
nal GDP
Percent Distribution
Currency and 56.9 18.1 25.3 43.3
Deposits
Insurance and 31.5 37.3 52.4 21.3
Pensions
Securities 12.4 39.1 16.8 28.8
Equities 6.1 22.4 9.3 5.3
Other 0.0 5.5 5.5 6.6
Personal sector assets are now more than 240 percent of
GDP (Table 2). A glance at the household sector's liabilities
reveals that it is not heavily burdened. At the end of 1996,
total liabilities stood at 64 percent of GDP, little changed from
63 percent at the peak of the bubble economy. Net of liabilities,
1. End-1996 for U.S. and Japan, end-1995 for U.K. and Germany. See Bank
of Japan, Comparative Economic and Financial Statistics, Federal Reserve Board,
U.S. Flow of Funds.
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Japanese household financial assets stood at 178 percent of
GDP, nearly the same as the level for the United States.
TABLE 2 FINANCIAL ASSETS 2 IN THE HOUSEHOLD SECTOR
Japan United States
1985 1990 1996 1996
Deposits 104.3 115.8 137.5 49.1
Life Insurance 27.7 45.1 60.7 7.6
Pensions 12.3 15.0 15.4 93.5
Bonds n.a. 10.6 7.1 24.5
Mutual Funds n.a. 9.1 6.3 20.7
Equities n.a. 19.3 14.8 60.9
Total Financial 130.9 152.0 177.7 178.9
Assets
While the size of Japan's household financial assets is not
unusual, the allocation of those assets is most unusual. Of the
total portfolio, 57 percent is in cash and deposits, compared
with less than 15 percent in the United States. More broadly,
Japanese households hold nearly 90 percent of their financial
savings in two relatively low-yield instruments: deposits and
life-insurance policies. The share of pensions, mutual funds,
and direct participation in asset markets-by holding bonds
and equities-is very low by international standards.
This skewed distribution represents an opportunity for
financial institutions to market their expertise to Japanese
households, and an opportunity for Japanese households to
reallocate their portfolios to gain higher yields. The Y1,200
trillion yen question is how firmly these opportunities will be
grasped.
2. Percent of GDP, end of year. Pensions include those held by Japanese life
insurance companies. See Bank of Japan, Flow of Fund Accounts, Federal Reserve
Board, U.S. Flow of Funds.
3. Includes pensions held by Japanese life insurance companies.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN'S FINANCIAL MARKETS
The roots of Japan's financial system on the eve of Big
Bang can be traced back in large part to the United States
occupation of Japan after the Second World War. General
MacArthur and his team of economists and lawyers mandated
revolutionary change for Japan's financial system. They dis-
mantled Japan's zaibatsu, the dominant industrial groups, by
banning and dissolving the holding companies that controlled
them, and by firing and blacklisting their managers. In order
to keep the securities business out of the hands of the former
zaibatsu banks, the occupation authorities also gave Japan's
financial markets a Glass-Steagall, in the form of Article 65 of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1948.4 Article 65 prohibit-
ed banks from participating in the domestic securities indus-
try, from holding more than five percent of a securities compa-
ny, and from selling equity or underwriting securities. To the
extent that independent, major securities companies grew up
after the war, the architects of the law were successful.
Nomura, Daiwa, and Nikko Securities-small institutions
trading bonds before 1948-exist today as major international
securities firms thanks to Article 65. The major keiretsu banks
with their array of branch networks and corporate clients could
otherwise have ended up dominating the securities business in
Japan.
But the byproducts of prohibiting most bank participation
in securities markets have been particularly severe in Japan.
To maintain the predominance of banks in the financial sys-
tem, securities and securities market activity were repressed.
Until the late 1980s, the corporate sector remained dependent
on bank loans rather than on the direct issuance of equity and
debt securities, and the Japanese household sector had pre-
cious few alternatives to bank deposits to maintain their sav-
ings. While corporations have taken advantage of increasing
access to international markets to diversify the sources of their
4. See Securities and Exchange Law, Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 65. See also
KAZUO TATEWAKI, BANKING AND FINANCE IN JAPAN: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
TOKYO MARKET 10 (stating that Law No. 25 of 1948 was "[probably the most
important post-war reform affecting commercial banks"); Ken Tsunematsu & Sht4i
Yanase, Japan-Documents: Laws & Regulations, in 2 INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
REGULATION 99 (Robert C. Rosen et al. eds., 1997) (offering an English translation
of the Securities and Exchange Law of 1948).
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financing over the past fifteen years, the household sector-as
I discussed earlier-still remains undiversified in its asset
selection.
Three features exemplify the traditional practice of finan-
cial market regulation in Japan. First, in accordance with
Article 65 and other laws, Japanese financial regulators have
compartmentalized the financial industry by kinds of financial
services, required a license for each segment of the industry,
and usually required that institutions operate exclusively in
the area specified by the license. The regulatory authorities
consistently denied entry of new participants into any of the
compartmentalized markets of banking, securities, and insur-
ance. The banking sector was further subdivided in terms of
long- and short-term finance, and a few long-term credit banks
were given exclusive authority to issue five-year fixed-rate
debentures, dominating the bond market.
Second, the authorities had restricted price and non-price
competition among the participants in each of the markets
through the regulation of deposit rates, stock brokerage com-
missions, and insurance premia. All kinds of financial services
were to be offered at the same price. Even means of non-price
competition such as branching and advertising were regulated.
Innovations by any group of institutions that attracted savers'
funds from another group by offering higher effective yields or
a better product were usually disallowed. As a result, the num-
ber of Japanese financial intermediaries has decreased very
little, if at all, in the major segments of the financial industry
in the past fifty years.
Third, the Japanese authorities had limited the range of
available securities in the name of investor protection. In many
markets, including our own, securities market regulators and
self-regulated exchanges restrict access to capital markets
through minimum criteria and disclosure requirements. But in
Japan, the criteria have been much more severe and wide-
ranging. There have been rules and numerical standards on
matters that in other countries would have been left to the
discretion of issuers, investors, and other related parties. For
example, complicated and restrictive eligibility criteria were
imposed on the issuance of straight bonds based on financial
ratios and credit ratings. Even for issuers able to satisfy those
criteria, a trustee system required that banks hold in trust
collateral for which they collected substantial fees.
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Of course, Japanese financial markets have seen a fair
degree of deregulation over the past two decades. As a result of
negotiations with the United States, the Yen-Dollar Accord in
1984' greatly increased the freedom of Japanese companies to
independently raise funds overseas in the Euromarkets. Inter-
est rates on bank deposits in Japan were deregulated in the
1980s and early 1990s. Our own Primary Dealers Act6 in the
late 1980s pressured Japanese regulatory authorities to open
up the underwriting and trading of Japanese government debt
to foreign competition. And in 1993 and 1994, banks were
allowed to establish subsidiaries that underwrote corporate
bonds. Many of these changes-while significant-have been
undertaken incrementally. In contrast, the Big Bang initiative
represents dramatic, rather than evolutionary, change planned
by the Japanese largely of their own initiative.
III. THE BIG BANG
Each of the above-mentioned traditional characteristics of
the Japanese regulatory regime promises to be shaken, and
eventually eliminated, by the reforms of the Big Bang. It has
been a year and a half since Prime Minister Hashimoto
launched the concept of a Big Bang reform of the Japanese
financial system. Some important Big Bang reforms have al-
ready been put in place, while others are scheduled for imple-
mentation over the next three years.
TABLE 3 OUTLINE OF THE BIG BANG REFORMS
Enacted in Fiscal 1997 (ending March 31, 1998)
Brokers allowed to handle unlisted or unregistered
stocks.
Brokerage houses allowed to offer "wrap accounts," which
function like combined stock investment and bank check-
ing accounts.
Investment trust companies allowed to sell their products
at banks.
5. U.S.-Japan Yen-Dollar Agreement Expected to Strengthen Japan's World
Economic Role, INT'L TRADE REP.'S U.S. EXPORT WKLY., June 5, 1984 at 1012-13.
6. See Primary Dealers Act of 1988, 22 U.S.C.A. § 5341 (West 1998).
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- Investment allocation rules for pension fund manage-
ment liberalized.
* Financial institutions allowed to establish holding com-
panies.
Enacted on April 1, 1998
* Stock brokerage commissions liberalized for transactions
of ¥50 million or more.
* Specialized foreign exchange bank system abolished, thus
allowing companies and individuals to conduct foreign
exchange transactions without government authorization.
* Prompt Corrective Action guidelines for banking sector
introduced.
- New Bank of Japan Law takes effect.
To be Enacted in Fiscal 1998
* Banks allowed to sell their own mutual funds over-the-
counter.
* Securities firms allowed to expand their asset-manage-
ment services, to include any derivatives and other new
investment instruments.
* Requirement for government licensing of securities bro-
kerages to be eliminated.
Fiscal 1999
Stock brokerage commissions fully liberalized.
- Banks allowed to issue straight bonds.
* Banks, trust banks, and securities companies allowed to
enter each other's markets.
Fiscal 2000
* Insurance companies allowed to enter the banking sector,
and banks and securities companies allowed to enter the
insurance sector.
5831998]
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A. Breaking Down Barriers
The Big Bang promotes competition by lowering, or even
eliminating, the barriers separating different sectors of the
financial industry. I described earlier how Japan's banking
industry developed its current divided structure, with commer-
cial banks, trust banks and long-term credit banks separated
by regulatory and informal barriers. Similar divisions charac-
terize Japan's financial industry more generally. To cite just
two examples, companies have not been allowed to compete in
both the life and non-life insurance markets, and brokerage
and asset management services have been rigidly separated.
An important tool for tearing down these barriers is a new
law which allows financial institutions to establish holding
companies. Parent corporations will now be able to offer a
range of financial services under one umbrella. Holding compa-
nies allow members of the group to cut costs by consolidating
overlapping operations. They also allow the group to pursue
integrated product development and market strategies. Al-
ready, the Fuyo group is working to establish a holding compa-
ny that will offer services in commercial banking, trust bank-
ing, and life and non-life insurance. A similar plan is being
studied by the Mitsui group.
The barriers separating financial institutions are receiving
additional blows from the Big Bang hammer.
e Starting last December, mutual fund companies were al-
lowed to sell their products at banks. In effect, a mutual fund
company simply rents space at a bank branch. However,
within the year, banks will be allowed to sell their own mutu-
al funds.
* By the end of 1999, banks, trust banks, and securities com-
panies will be able to enter each other's markets. Soon after,
insurance companies will be allowed to enter the banking
sector, and banking and securities companies will be allowed
to enter the insurance sector.
Let me give you a more concrete sense of what this lower-
ing of barriers will mean in practice. Today, only trust banks,
insurers, and certified asset managers are allowed to manage
pension funds. By the end of 1999, brokerage firms' trust-bank-
ing subsidiaries will be allowed to manage pension funds. Bro-
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kerage firms would also compete with banks by offering "wrap
accounts," in which customers could deposit paychecks or pay
bills.
B. Freeing Prices
Reducing barriers to entry brings a meaningful increase in
competition only when prices are set by market forces. The Big
Bang reforms also include important steps in this direction.
9 Starting this month, securities companies were allowed
freedom to set commissions on trades of more than Y50 mil-
lion ($384,000). Trades had previously been subject to fixed
brokerage fees. Already, securities companies have an-
nounced cuts in brokerage fees as much as 50 percent for
large trades. Commissions on securities trades will be fully
liberalized by 2000.
* Auto insurance rates were liberalized last September. The
Japanese government plans to lift all restrictions on property
and casualty insurance premiums by July of this year.
C. Opening Japan to the World
The liberalization of foreign-exchange transactions, effec-
tive this month, is another element of the Big Bang reforms
that deserves note. Previously, only authorized foreign-ex-
change banks were allowed to conduct transactions in other
currencies. Designated banks were supposed to determine
whether a customer's foreign-exchange transactions met Minis-
try of Finance (MoF) guidelines. Under this protected system,
the foreign-exchange fees of Japanese banks were much higher
than those of their U.S. counterparts. This encouraged Japa-
nese multinationals to transfer much of their foreign-exchange
operations to subsidiaries in London, New York, Hong Kong,
and Singapore and helps explain why the yen lags far behind
the dollar and the deutschemark as a vehicle for international
transactions.
Under the new foreign-exchange law, authorized banks
lose their monopoly on foreign-exchange transactions. Now,
any business enterprise can enter into foreign-exchange trans-
actions without government authorization. Japanese parent
companies should now be able to catch up with their overseas
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subsidiaries and foreign multinationals in global money-man-
agement techniques.
More important, the new foreign-exchange law allows
domestic investors to open accounts in any currency with for-
eign banks and securities companies, without prior MoF au-
thorization. The fact that Japanese residents now have unfet-
tered access to foreign markets represents a crucial spur to
financial reorganization. If Japanese financial companies do
not offer investors the returns, products, and services available
abroad, they may find their customers fleeing to the United
States or European markets.
The potential for increased Japanese holdings of non-yen
deposits is especially great, precisely because the household
sector's exposure to non-yen assets is so limited. Direct hold-
ings of deposits and securities amount to only 0.5 percent of
total assets. Indirect holdings, through life insurance policies,
pensions, and trusts, total only two percent of total assets.
This represents only a fraction of the corresponding figures for
the United States and other G-7 countries.
D. Greater Transparency in Monetary Policy and Bank
Regulation
No review of the Big Bang program would be complete
without mentioning import reforms affecting monetary policy
and bank supervision.
The new Bank of Japan Law,' effective this month, in-
creases the independence of the monetary authorities and
lends greater transparency to the conduct of monetary policy.
Increased independence is achieved through changes in the
Bank's governing structure. Under the old system, representa-
tives of the MoF and the Economic Planning Agency sat as
voting members on the Bank of Japan's (BoJ's) policy board.
Under the new system, representatives of these government
agencies cannot be members of the policy board, although they
can express their opinions at board meetings. Greater trans-
7. See The Bank of Japan Law: Preliminary Translation by the Bank of
Japan (unpublished manuscript on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International
Law). See also Tomohiko Takahashi, The New Bank of Japan Law: Moving To-
ward Greater Central Bank Independence (visited on Aug. 5, 1998) <http'/Iwww.nli-
research.co.jp/ENG/resea/econo/eco9711b.HTM> (outlining the history of the revi-
sions to the Bank of Japan Law).
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parency is achieved through release of the minutes of the poli-
cy board's deliberations, with a lag of only a few weeks.
As for bank supervision, new Prompt Corrective Action
guidelines should help bring Japan's domestic institutions up
to global standards of capital adequacy. The guidelines require
banks to grade their loan portfolios according to new, more
stringent standards, and to maintain loan-loss reserves consis-
tent with the loan portfolio's quality. The internal grading and
corresponding loan-loss reserves must be approved annually by
a certified public auditor, and a new bank supervisory authori-
ty, the Financial Institution Supervisory Agency, will conduct
on-site examinations.
IV. THE RESTRUCTURING OF JAPAN'S FINANCIAL INDUSTRY
I have described above how Big Bang enhances competi-
tion in Japan's financial industry. This increase in competition
should bring higher returns for savers, a wider choice of prod-
ucts, lower fees, and better service. However, competition cre-
ates losers as well as winners, even if it is good for the econo-
my as a whole. To survive in the new, competitive environ-
ment, Japanese financial firms will have to improve their skills
in asset management, develop innovative financial products,
strengthen their distribution systems, and cut costs by stream-
lining their operations. If the experience of financial reform in
the United States and United Kingdom is any guide, some
weaker firms will not be up to the challenge. A certain degree
of consolidation in the Japanese financial industry is inevita-
ble-and healthy.
It is too early to say precisely what course the on-going
restructuring of the Japanese financial industry will follow.
However, there are already some encouraging signs. I have
already mentioned that some companies are planning to unite
under a holding-company umbrella to pursue an integrated
market strategy and eliminate redundant operations. I also
noted that many securities companies have responded to the
recent liberalization of brokerage fees by adopting steep fee
cuts. Recent months have seen the announcement of several
mergers among smaller securities companies. Banks, insurers,
and securities companies alike have announced plans to cut
costs by trimming staff and closing money-losing branches.
Several financial companies have announced plans to link pay
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with performance-an important departure from the tradition-
al emphasis on seniority. Innovative financial products are also
being developed. Sakura Bank is offering a three-month depos-
it which has a higher yield if the dollar does not depreciate.
One important aspect of the restructuring of Japan's finan-
cial industry is already well-advanced. Foreign financial firms
have dramatically increased their presence in Japan. To cite
one recent, well-publicized example, Merrill Lynch-starting
essentially from scratch-has established a major retail bro-
kerage presence in Japan, absorbing over 1,000 former employ-
ees of failed Yamaichi Securities in the process. Much of the
increased foreign presence in Japan comes in the form of tie-
ups with local companies.
TABLE 4 RECENT INTERNATIONAL TIE-Ups
April 1997
June 1997
July 1997
July 1997
July 1997
Nippon Credit
Bank and Bankers
Trust New York
Corp.
Nippon Life Insur-
ance and Putnam
Investments
Sumitomo Trust &
Banking Co. and
NatWest
Gartmore Invest-
ment Management
Japan
Long-Term Credit
Bank of Japan
and Swiss Bank
Corp.
Nikko Securities
and Smith Barney
International
Securitizing assets
in Japan
Developing financial
products
Managing pension
funds in Europe
Alliance on invest-
ment banking, asset
management and
private banking
Joint venture for
"wrap accounts"
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October 1997
December
1997
February
1998
March 1998
March 1998
Daiwa Securities
and Bankers
Trust New York
Corp.
Sumitomo Trust &
Banking Co. and
Citibank
GE Capital Servic-
es Inc. and Toho
Mutual Life Insur-
ance
Meiji Life Insur-
ance and Dresdner
Bank
Jardine Fleming
Holdings Ltd.,
Yasada Mutual
Life and others
Selling investment
funds
Guaranteeing trust
deposits
Selling insurance
through Toho's
branches
Joint venture for
asset management
services
Establish securities
company specializing
in investment trust
sales in Japan
The entry of foreign firms into the Japanese market is a
sign that some of the opportunities I mentioned at the outset
of this Essay are indeed being grasped. Japanese savers will
now enjoy expanded access to foreign expertise in asset man-
agement and in handling derivatives and other complex finan-
cial products. At the same time, Japanese firms will now have
to compete on an equal footing with firms that have honed
their skills in more liberalized markets. This will undoubtedly
accelerate the consolidation of the financial industry that I
mentioned earlier. At the end of the day, however, Japanese
financial firms may become as competitive as its manufactur-
ers.
V. UNRESOLVED ISSUES
So far, I have outlined the Big Bang reforms, pointed to
the opportunities they represent, and described how Japanese
and foreign firms are responding to those opportunities. Before
closing, I would like to turn to two unresolved issues that will
become important as the Big Bang unfolds.
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A. Public Financial Institutions
Reform of Japan's Postal Savings System represents an
important missing piece of the Big Bang program. The Postal
Savings System, with ¥240 ($1.83 trillion) in deposits, is the
world's largest bank. This System accounts for more than one-
third of all personal deposits in Japan. Private-sector competi-
tors have long comblained that the Postal Savings System
enjoys an unfair advantage because it is backed by the full
faith and credit of the government. Indeed, over the last sever-
al years, as concerns about the health of the private banking
sector have mounted, growth in postal savings deposits has far
out paced growth in private bank deposits.
The Postal Savings System also enjoys other important
advantages. Because it is free from the need to generate a
return for shareholders, the System has consistently been able
to offer higher returns than private banks. It also possesses an
unparalleled distribution system because every post office is in
effect a bank branch. In fact, your local letter carriers will pick
up your passbook and cash deposit during his morning rounds,
and return the stamped passbook that evening.
The original Big Bang program called for the Postal Sav-
ings System to be privatized by 2001. Instead, the government
now plans to transfer control over both institutions from the
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications to a new public
corporation. In effect, the System will remain under govern-
ment control, and its employees will remain public servants.
At the simplest level, leaving one-third of the banking
system in the public sector appears at odds with the goal of
fostering a financial system governed by market principles.
More generally, the presence of a large competitor uncon-
strained by the need to maintain profits may encourage private
banks to take risks that they otherwise would not need to
take.
B. Disclosure and Corporate Governance
Increasing expected returns to the Japanese investor may
also require significant changes in disclosure and corporate
governance in Japan. At present, outside shareholders have
little voice in corporate management, and little realizable
claim on corporate assets beyond small dividend payments.
The market for corporate control is undeveloped and remains
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stifled by extensive cross-shareholdings.
Banks have traditionally been seen as playing the critical
role in the governance of firms in Japan, as they used various
means of influence to enforce the restructuring of poorly man-
aged firms in bad times. But they can no longer fulfill this role
as they face their own need to restructure. Cross-share hold-
ings are unwinding among banks and firms, and corporations
are changing the basis upon which they choose banks. Banks
are less willing to bail out members of their group. These are
healthy developments, but alternative means of ensuring ade-
quate corporate governance should be encouraged.
For markets to provide adequate feedback to poorly man-
aged companies, transparent and credible sources of financial
information must be available to those markets. Japan's ac-
counting standards are at odds with international standards.
The recent financial failures in Japan are cases in point.
Nissan Life was hiding latent losses of $1.4 billion when it
failed. Yamaichi Securities held nearly $2 billion in hidden
losses on securities investments when it collapsed. Hokkaido
Takushoku Bank, which was paying dividends and declaring
profits through 1997, had window-dressed its accounts by
around $3 billion prior to bankruptcy.
One prominent Japanese economist has encouraged Japa-
nese financial institutions to list on the New York Stock Ex-
change and disclose GAAP-based financial statements to earn
the credibility and trust that they have had trouble achieving
based on domestic financial statements.
Alternatively, the incentives for accountants to do a better
job might be put in place through a greater use of private legal
recourse as in the United States. The creditors of Japan Hous-
ing Finance, the largest of the failed jusen, have sued its audi-
tors for compensation. If large judgments result, this precedent
may provide a healthy incentive for auditors to do better
jobs-as well as an array of new business opportunities for the
lawyers.
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In sum, the infrastructure of a competitive market econo-
my includes adequate supervision and oversight of financial
institutions, as well as adequate internal and external auditing
procedures, by credible accountants and rating agencies. In the
long-term, restoring financial competitiveness in Japan will
involve more than lowering the barriers to competition. Howev-
er, the changes that Japan is undertaking with the Big Bang
are certainly large steps in the right direction.
